One last fresh Carnegie Politika article that we felt were worth translating and posting. Hope you enjoy them. Back to the standard fare tomorrow.
Someone Else’s Deal: What Russia Wants From the US-Iran Nuclear Deal
Moscow is not thrilled about the prospect of sanctions on Tehran being lifted, but if a deal is inevitable, it is ready to take an active part in it.
Nikita Smagin
27 May 2025
The prospects for a new nuclear deal between the US and Iran are still very much in doubt, but much more has been done than many expected. Donald Trump, who once tore up the previous version of the agreement, seems serious about signing it this time. Washington has not only held several rounds of talks with the Iranians, but has also dropped many of its demands on Tehran.
All this places a difficult choice in the lap of Russia, which has become close to Iran on the basis of a common conflict with the West: sabotage the negotiations in order to keep its ally isolated by sanctions, or try to become an important mediator in the agreement, as it did with the previous version of the deal under President Barack Obama.
The same thing, just worse
Trump’s aggressive push for a new nuclear deal with Tehran may seem somewhat surprising, given that he was the one who tore up the old one during his first term. Then, in 2017, the Republicans not only unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and imposed a raft of old and new sanctions on Iran, but also made all-or-nothing demands for a return to negotiations.
The Iranians were asked to abandon both their nuclear enrichment and their missile programs, and to end all support for their proxy forces in the region. In the end, Tehran did not even sit down at the negotiating table, despite the heavy blow to the economy caused by the intensified return of sanctions.
However, the policy of maximum pressure on Iran has failed, and now Trump is taking a completely different position. He is extremely pragmatic and is trying to conclude as many deals as possible in the shortest possible time. This has already led to Washington’s agreements with the Yemeni Houthis and unexpected steps to normalize relations with the new Syrian authorities. Another consequence of this pragmatism was the cooling of Trump’s relations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which was clearly evident when the American president did not stop by Israel during his tour of the Middle East.
In the current version, Trump’s demands on Iran look much more modest. Judging by the leaks, the bargaining today is conducted exclusively around the nuclear program, without attempts to weave in other regional security issues. Ideally, the deal should guarantee that Iran will never be able to obtain nuclear weapons, and in return, the United States will lift sanctions, which is theoretically possible, given the Republican majority in both houses of Congress.
The main problem in the talks is that the two countries have very different ideas about how to ensure that the other side will keep its end of the bargain. Tehran says it should retain the right to enrich uranium, but is willing to reduce the level of enrichment and allow observers to verify.
A workable scenario would be enrichment to 4% under international control. At least that was fine with Tehran during the previous deal struck with President Obama. But now the US insists that Iran abandon enrichment entirely and import fuel for its nuclear plants.
In no uncertain terms, Tehran calls the complete abandonment of enrichment unacceptable, but the negotiations are ongoing, which means it is possible that Washington may make new concessions. Especially since the situation is currently in Iran’s favor: the Iranians were able not only to draw Trump into negotiations, but also to push back the threat of a military solution to the Iranian nuclear problem thanks to the cooldown between the United States and Israel. Yet everything may still fall through, given the inconstancy of the current American administration.
The Kremlin’s priorities
For Russia, the unexpectedly active negotiations between Washington and Tehran create a difficult choice. In general, lifting sanctions on Iran is not in the Kremlin’s interests. Moscow is quite happy with the situation where the Islamic Republic is forced to develop relations with Russia due to isolation from the West. This makes Iran a reliable partner – it does not pay attention to sanctions, so it is possible to build long-term projects with it. But if the sanctions are lifted, Tehran’s position could change.
It is also worth adding here the possible introduction of additional volumes of Iranian crude oil onto world markets. This prospect has always worried the Russian side, which views Iran as a major competitor on the world hydrocarbon market. To the point, the conclusion of a new nuclear deal between Iran and the US is not the best scenario for the Kremlin.
However, a complete failure of the negotiations is also dangerous – then the US could return to the military scenario. American bombings will inevitably destabilize Iran to the point of risking the country’s disintegration. This will leave Russia with a stream of refugees and, possibly, a civil war next door, on top of which it could permanently shelve numerous Russian projects in Iran, where Moscow has been actively investing in recent years.
Thus, the ideal scenario for Russia would be endless negotiations between Tehran and Washington without a real agreement. In a sense, this is what is happening now, but the situation could swing one way or the other at any moment.
Even if Russia wanted to sabotage the Iran-US deal, it has little power to influence the negotiating process. If Washington and Tehran reach an agreement, it will be impossible to prevent it. So if a deal looks inevitable, the Kremlin will likely try to position itself as an important participant in it, in order to gain leverage over the process, as it did in the previous agreement under President Obama.
Both Iran and the US are now interested in Russia’s participation. Tehran needs intermediaries to increase the chances of the agreement being implemented and to exclude the possibility that Trump or the next US president will withdraw from it again in a few years. Therefore, it is in Iran’s interests to involve as many parties as possible in the deal: the IAEA, China, and Russia, as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Tehran also needs intermediaries as sources of observers. If the deal is only for the Americans, they will have to be given access to monitor Iranian nuclear facilities.
Meanwhile, the US needs Russian participation to resolve technical issues. In the last deal, it was Russia that agreed to accept spent nuclear fuel from Iran, something other participants were not prepared to do. A similar situation is possible now.
In any event, Iran will have to dispose of the excess uranium regardless. And it appears that Russia is seen as the party ready to take on this function. First, it has the technical capabilities to accept and process it. Second, this is the option that Tehran insists on. After all, it will be much easier for Iran to get enriched uranium back from Russia if the US withdraws from the deal again. For the Kremlin, such a development would be an acceptable compromise. Despite all the costs that lifting sanctions on Iran creates for Russia, turning Moscow into an indispensable mediator between Tehran and Washington creates a sense of escaping isolation. In addition, it gives the Russian side real leverage over American-Iranian relations. However, endless and fruitless negotiations would still be preferable for Russia: so that there is no attack on Iran and sanctions are not lifted.
Translating History 