Translating History has recently received a small bundle of declassified Russian-language materials related to Soviet diplomatic involvement in the Korean War, and will be publishing the translations thereof in the coming week. We hope they may be of interest to our readers.
The materials can be divided into two groups. The first group includes official documents: diplomatic correspondence, a statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in connection with the adoption of a resolution on Korea by the UN Security Council on June 27, 1950; certificates on the dispatch of Soviet specialists to the DPRK, drafts of appeals and events with an anti-American bent, and other documents. These materials make it possible to trace the position of the Soviet leadership on the Korean problem in the period from autumn 1949 to winter 1951.
The first document in this group chronologically is the document presented in this post, a directive from Gromylo to the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, T. F. Shtykov. As can be seen from the text, in August–September 1949, meetings took place between the North Korean leadership and Soviet embassy representatives. At these meetings, Kim Il Sung raised the issue of an offensive by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) into South Korea and the unification of the country through military means. In the event that the Soviet leaders forbade the KPA to conduct a large-scale operation, he wanted to obtain permission to seize the Ongjin Peninsula.
However, Stalin and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered a general offensive in the South to be inadvisable for a number of reasons:
1. The North Korean army was in the middle of formation and thus not ready for an offensive from a military standpoint.
2. North Korea did not have broad popular support in the South, the guerrilla movement there was not sufficiently developed, and it would be difficult to count on its help
3. The KPA offensive would give the US a reason to accuse the DPRK of aggression, which could lead to the introduction of US troops into South Korea.
Stalin did not support an operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula either. The directive stated that the North Korean leadership “had not exhausted all avenues in the struggle for the peaceful unification of the country.”
Thus, Soviet policy on the Korean issue in the early autumn of 1949 was characterized by pragmatism and self-restraint. During this period, the Soviet leadership adhered to the course of preserving the existing geopolitical balance on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, as the directive shows, Moscow did not reject the idea of a forced unification of Korea in principle. It considered it at that time “neither judicious nor timely”.
Unfortunately, the collection lacks the documents that would allow us to trace the change in the Soviet leader’s position from late 1949 to June 25, 1950, and to identify the factors that persuaded Stalin to support Kim Il Sung in his desire to unify Korea by military means.
Directive to the Soviet Embassy in Korea
Draft
Secret
You need to meet with Kim Il-Sung and Pak Pak Hon-Yong and tell them the following:
In connection with the issues you raised in the conversation on August 12 of this year and your request, expressed through your secretary on September 3, 1949, I am informing you of our opinion on the issues raised.
On the first issue – regarding a general offensive against South Korea.
It is neither judicious nor timely to launch a general offensive of the People’s Army into the South in the current situation for the following reasons:
First, such an offensive on the initiative of the DPRK Government could be used by reacting to accuse the government in the eyes of public opinion of aggressive intentions and a desire to drag the country into war.
Second, before deciding on the need to begin the struggle for the unification of the country by armed means, one should weigh all the circumstances that one would have to face. In order to begin such a serious undertaking, one must be completely confident of success. Meanwhile, in the current situation, such success is hardly possible.
On the one hand, the people in the south are not well prepared for such an offensive, and it is unknown how widely the people in South Korea can rise up to support the People’s Army. It should be taken into account that the partisan movement is not sufficiently developed, and therefore it is difficult to count on significant assistance from the South Korean partisans.
In addition, it must be taken into account that the southerners have a land army that is numerically superior to the People’s Army. In addition, they have a navy. While the South Korean army may be poorly prepared in military terms, given its current social composition, it can be assumed that it will put up strong resistance to the People’s Army.
On the other hand, the People’s Army, although better prepared militarily and equipped with tanks and aircraft, has a high political and moral state; however, it is numerically inferior to the southern army and, in addition, does not have a navy. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not capable of fulfilling such a large task alone. It should also be taken into account that the People’s Army has not yet completed the organizational measures being taken, viz.: the mechanized brigade is not fully provided with equipment, the formation of the air division has not been completed, and the number of flight personnel is woefully lacking.
Third, the People’s Army’s advance into the south may give the Americans a reason to raise the issue at the UN session, accuse the DRPK government of aggression, and obtain the General Assembly’s consent to the introduction of American troops into South Korea. The introduction of American troops into South Korea may entail a long-term occupation of the southern part of the country, and consequently, a delay in the unification [of Korea].
On the second issue. Regarding an operation to capture the Ongjin Peninsula.
We feel that in the current situation it is also inadvisable to carry out such an operation. A People’s Army offensive on the Ongjin Peninsula will inevitably provoke countermeasures from the southerners and this operation will lead to the beginning of military actions on a large scale.
On the third issue. Regarding the partisan movement.
We regard the considerations you have expressed on this issue positively, and you should assist and foster this movement. Such a movement will undermine the existing regime in South Korea and may force the South Korean government to discuss proposals for the peaceful unification of the country, or it may create conditions for the overthrow of this government altogether.
You should draw the attention of Kim Il-Sung and Pak Hon-Yong to the fact that they have not exhausted all avenues in the struggle for the peaceful unification of the country, and that such an important and politically advantageous document for them as the Fatherland Front’s appeal for the peaceful unification of the country was not used by them to the full extent to raise a broad movement of the people for the implementation of this unification. They should now, especially in connection with the upcoming discussion of the Korean question in the UN, organize such a movement both in the North and South.
A.G. [Andrei Gromyko] 1949
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