Translating History continues its look at the early days of the Korean War with a new translation of a declassified Top Secret document from 1951, Document 5 in our series.
Stalin’s position, as well as that of his entourage, regarding the Korean issue in the winter of 1951 is revealed by secret instructions from the Kremlin (presumably via Gromyko) to Vladimir Razuvayev, the new Soviet ambassador to North Korea (see document 5). The instructions show that, in January 1951, there was no unanimity of opinion in the leadership of the DPRK in how to deal with the military-political situation; part of the North Korean leadership had already been inclined toward peace negotiations since October 1950. But, as DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Hon-yong stated, the Koreans would continue to fight “if the Soviet Union and China consider the continuation of the war useful.”
Thus, the contents of the instruction indirectly testify that in 1951, Stalin was interested in continuing the war, which tied up the military and political forces of the United States. The fate of Korea itself was of little interest to the Soviet leader; the national interests of the Korean people were ignored. The Soviet leadership continued to claim that Korea was fighting for its own interests, and the USSR was only helping in the struggle for liberation.
Document 5. North Korea
Top Secret
Soviet Embassy
In your telegram No. 71, you reported, from Pak Hon-yong, about his conversation with Peng Dehuai at the joint staff headquarters. Your information was limited to simply relaying Peng Dehuai’s statements from the words of his interlocutor. As for the statements of Pak Hon-yong himself, you apparently did not inquire into this side of the matter and did not report anything about it. Here too, you limited yourself to repeating Pak Hon-yong’s words, as if he had told Peng Dehuai that the Political Council “warned the party against illusions regarding the armistice negotiations and called for being prepared to continue the struggle.” You did not inquire why the Political Council did this and, in general, did not want to delve into the meaning of what Pak Hon-yong said.
Meanwhile, according to information received from another source, the situation was completely different from what you describe from Pak’s words. We have information that Pak Hon-yong, during his stay at headquarters on January 15-16, spoke about the difficult situation of the Korean people, declaring that the Korean people want peace and do not want to see the war continue to be waged. He added that the Koreans will continue waging war if the Soviet Union and China consider continuing the war useful. There is reason to believe that Peng Dehuai rebuffed Pak Hon-yong, declaring that Korea is fighting for its own interests, and the Soviet Union and China are only helping in the struggle for the liberation of Korea.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that Pak Hon-yong’s statements are no accident, since he had already made similar statements in October 1950. It also follows from this that there is no proper unanimity of opinion in the leading circles of the Workers’ Party in assessing the ongoing war.
From the information provided, it is clear that Pak Hon-yong did not inform you of the actual content of his conversation at headquarters, and you did not take your duties seriously.
All of this shows that you approached Pak Hon-yong’s message uncritically, relying entirely on his words. In general, you are poorly informed about the actual mood in Korean leadership circles, you do not delve into this important matter, and you do not provide the center with the necessary information on such issues. For the Soviet ambassador to Korea, such an attitude to his political duties is completely unacceptable. Keep this in mind for the future.
Owing to the above, you should meet with Kim Il Sung and inquire tactfully and cautiously about how the current situation in Korea is being assessed in the ruling Korean circles, whether there is unanimity of views among them, and try to clarify the existing differences in the assessment of the situation and in the planned measures. Kim Il Sung should not, however, be informed of the above information regarding Pak Hon-yong.
© 2025 by Michael Estes and TranslatingHistory.org
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