The following is a translation of an encrypted telegram from London on the need to keep Japan out of the world conflict and “tear her away from the Axis powers by all means.” The information was sent to Moscow by an unknown Soviet agent, which cites, verbatim, information provided from Soviet agent “List” (British civil servant John Cairncross) via VADIM (Soviet London resident Anatoly Gorsky).
TOP SECRET
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 7550, 7553
From LONDON
Received 30 October 1941 at 0800 Decoded 31 October 1941 at 0100
Materials from “List”.
I am transmitting the contents of telegram No. 5653 from the British Foreign Office, dated 17 October, to Lord Halifax:
“In response to your telegram 4706 from 15 October:
“1) In the time that has elapsed since your conversation with Mr. [Cordell] Hull in Whitehall, it is clear that, due to delays in the Washington negotiations, policy guidance has wound up in the hands of the extremists. Because of this, we feel it necessary, together with the US government, to summarize and review the situation, keeping in mind:
[Translator Note: The intercepted cable was apparently transmitted to Moscow through audio means; “Whitehall” was rendered as “Вайпал” {Vaypal} and was underlined to suggest that the meaning of the word was unclear to the recipient.]
“a) The impetus that has been spurred by the German advances toward Moscow to those elements that are speaking out in favor of a statement as soon as possible;
“b) The effect of our economic pressure on Japan.
“2) It is possible that the Japanese are moving southward, for example against Siam, and we have already received a request for cooperation from the Prime Minister of Siam. Japan however understands that such a move could put her on a collision course with the united Anglo-American-Chinese-Dutch forces. There is far less risk in a push north, where Japan has already concentrated massive forces. The Japanese are also hoping that the [Soviet] government’s evacuation from Moscow and subsequent weakening of its authority will ultimately result in a level of disruption of the Soviet troops in Siberia. Therefore we must reckon with the eventuality of a Japanese attack on Ru*ssia in the near future.
“3) Although we can do very little in that event (you must make it clear that we have not yet made any decisions on this issue), it is still advisable for us to immediately consult with the US government. So long as our Russian allies are putting up a resistance against the Germans in the west, it is critical that we do not weaken or discourage that resistance by our inability to support them with everything we can – in the Far East. We must also take into account the situation with their Dutch ally and the impact they will feel if we are unable to assist the Russians.
“4) Even more important is the issue of whether or not we will allow Japan to attack us ‘one after the other’. Having finished with Russia, strengthened and free from a Russian threat, the Japanese will be in a position to attack us the moment they find it most suitable, and undoubtedly to coincide with a time when Germany is able to do the same in the west.
“5) It is already over for Indochina. The Japanese have created their bases there and if they will be allowed to rid themselves of the threat to the rear by attacking Russia, we will find ourselves in extremely serious danger.
“6) We are very satisfied with having transferred the resolution of the Japanese problem to the US government and having committed ourselves to support the US in employing absolute maximum economic pressure. In his 20 August radio speech the Prime Minister made it perfectly clear that if the American efforts to reach a peaceful solution meet little or no success, we will side with the US. The situation is true even today. After the actions of Great Britain alone will be of little effect, we are prepared to support any, even the most serious actions, that the US decides to undertake. Unity, which we would prefer, if it is possible to keep Japan out of the world conflict and tear her away from the Axis powers using all means available short of war. If, in the opinion of the US government, we can do anything to keep Japan out of the war, we would be happy to discuss this straight away.
“8) Apprise Mr. Hull of all of the above, and ask him if he would report to us regarding what actions the US intends to undertake in the event of a Japanese attack on Russia.”
28 October 1941 No. 1229 VADIM
Translation © 2025 by Michael Estes and TranslatingHistory.org
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