November 1941: Top Secret Telegram Reveals Anthony Eden-Lord Halifax Discussion of UK/US Actions if Japan Attacks the Soviets

The following is a translation of an enciphered telegram from Anthony Eden to the British Embassy in Moscow on possible actions of the USA and England in the event of a Japanese attack on the USSR. Information originating from Soviet agent “List” (British civil servant John Cairncross) via VADIM (Soviet London resident Anatoly Gorsky).

TOP SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM No. 7872

From LONDON

Received 9 November 1941 at 2315              Decoded 10 November 1941 at 2335

               Materials from “List”.

               We are transmitting the contents of telegram No. 73 from [Anthony] Eden dated 2 November to the British embassy in Moscow:

               “1. Immediately after the collapse of the Konoe government, I provided our ambassador in Washington the appropriate instructions to discuss with the US government the issue of the possibility of carrying out certain actions in the event that Japan attacks the Soviet Union.

               “At that time it had appeared quite possible, taking into account the catalyzing effect of Germany’s successes in their advance on Moscow, the pressure from our economic measures, and the probability of Japan hoping to avoid a direct confrontation with England, America, China, and the Dutch Indies, a likely event should they advance to the south. Yet all of the information received since then indicates the high probability of a Japanese attack on Yunnan. Below, I am providing classified information on the considerations that Lord Halifax, per my request, should have shared with the US government.

               “2. In spite of the little that we can offer in terms of helping Russia, we felt it necessary to immediately consult with the US in view of: a) the danger of discouraging or weakening Russian resistance in the west in the event that our efforts to provide all possible support to Russia in the Far East would end in failure; b) the effect (of a similar failure in Holland) is the danger of presenting Japan with the opportunity to attack us alone.

               “3. We were quite satisfied to see the Japanese problem handed off to the Americans to resolve, and supported them in applying economic pressure on Japan and made it known that we would be standing by their side in the event they went to war with Japan. We are now prepared to support any action, no matter how serious, that the US decides to take, or quickly examine any recommendation made to keep Japan from entering the war that the US government finds suitable for that purpose.

               “4. We have not received any such proposal thus far.

               “Meanwhile, the Soviet ambassador is set on the advisability of an Anglo-American warning to Japan (reference my telegram No. 57), whereupon I informed Lord Halifax that, based on my current impression, a warning would indeed be desirable. The Soviet ambassador, speaking with me on 27 October about the Soviet-Japanese border incident, which he was rather angry about, asked me if I had any information about the possible US attitude toward Japan in the event the latter attacks the USSR.

               “I had to reply in the negative.”

               No. 1274           VADIM                8 November 1941

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