The following is a translation of a 2 September 1943 Top Secret message from the People’s Commissar Of Foreign Affairs Of The USSR Vyacheslav Molotov To Soviet Ambassador To The US Andrey Gromyko and Soviet Charge D’Affairs Of The USSR In Great Britain Arkady Sobolev.
2 September 1943
Top Secret
Priority
On 26 August I received both Kerr and Standley simultaneously.
1. Kerr and Standley handed me a written communication about the decisions taken at the Quebec Conference, adding verbally that this communication originated from Churchill and Roosevelt, and was intended for Comrade Stalin. The communication itself, contrary to custom, did not indicate who it originated from or to whom it was addressed. Therefore, on August 27, I sent a letter to Kerr, drawing his attention to this circumstance and asking him to clarify the ambiguity. That same day, Kerr confirmed in writing, with an apology, that this was a communication originating from Churchill and Roosevelt and intended for Comrade Stalin.
2. Kerr separately handed me a letter, addressed to me, regarding negotiations with Italian General Castellano. Attached to the letter was the text of the terms of Italy’s surrender, agreed upon between the British and American governments. Kerr stated that this text expresses in legal terms what had previously been communicated to us through Sobolev and approved by the Soviet government. The letter states that the surrender agreement is expected to be concluded with Italy, Britain, and the United States in the name of the United Nations, and that General Eisenhower is to sign this document. The British government expresses the hope that this arrangement will be acceptable to the Soviet government and that the Soviet government will authorize General Eisenhower to sign this document in its name. If the Soviet government wishes to have a representative present at the signing, such a decision would be highly welcome. The letter also reports that General Castellano stated that the Italian government would respond by August 29 and that if no response was received by midnight on August 30, it should be assumed that the terms had not been accepted.
In conclusion, the letter states that this message is in no sense a response to Comrade Stalin’s message of August 22 regarding the creation of a tripartite military-political commission, which is being given serious attention.
On August 27, in response to Kerr’s letter, I sent him a letter informing him of the USSR government’s approval of the submitted terms of Italy’s surrender, and that the Soviet Union was authorizing General Eisenhower to sign these terms of surrender. My letter also stated that the Soviet Union believed that in this case there was no need for a special Soviet representative to be present when General Eisenhower signed the terms of Italy’s surrender.
Submitted for your information.
MOLOTOV
Translation © 2025 by Michael Estes and TranslatingHistory.org
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