Another in our series of translations of the latest Carnegie Politika articles.
After the Parade. Why Russia Accused Serbia of Betrayal.
Considering that Serbian shells for Ukraine became public knowledge back in early 2023, Moscow had no reason to lose its temper and punish Vucic. In fact, it did not punish him, but instead helped him in a difficult international situation.
Maksim Samorukov
2 June 2025
The news that Serbia supplies weapons to Ukraine through third countries ceased to be news more than two years ago. It ceased to be news so much that in June 2024, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic either bragged or justified himself in an interview with the Financial Times that the supplies had reached 800 million euros and he could not control who would end up with these shells, and Serbian factories had to work.
Russian authorities had not commented on the matter all this time, until the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service published a press release on May 28, declaring that such deliveries had indeed taken place and that Serbia was “shooting Russia in the back.” What was surprising about the SVR publication was not only its harsh tone, but also the date of its release – just a couple of weeks after Vucic had exposed himself to criticism from all corners of Europe for going to Moscow for the parade on May 9. Just then, Russian-Serbian friendship was being presented as unbreakable, despite the war and sanctions, and suddenly Russia makes a complete U-turn and accuses the Serbs of helping its enemies, stopping short of accusing them of killing Russian soldiers.
However, it is too early to bury the friendship between Moscow and Belgrade. Of course, the Russian leadership is hardly happy that the Ukrainians are making up for the shortage of shells by acquiring supplies from Serbia, especially on such a large scale. But it is no coincidence that the Kremlin ignored this issue for more than two years. The invasion of Ukraine created so many problems for Russia in Europe that the value of the preserved cooperation with Serbia had increased sharply. And no other Serbian leader will be able to do more for Moscow than Vucic, no matter how two-faced the current Serbian president is.
That the Kremlin still has no plans to create serious problems for Vucic became clear almost immediately after the SVR press release. The topic of Serbian betrayal did not grow legs at all. State channels remained silent about it, and high-ranking government officials did not comment on it. If such Serbian media stars as Sergei Shoigu or Nikolai Patrushev, not to mention Vladimir Putin himself, had announced the “stab in the back,” all of Serbia would have been discussing it for months. But no, it was limited to a short text from the faceless SVR press service, which even pro-war Telegram channels, ready to look for traitors everywhere, only briefly mentioned without much emotion.
Such precision allowed Vucic to easily neutralize the possible damage from the publication inside his country and even turn the incident to his advantage. He himself publicly commented on the press release so that everyone in the West could see how inappropriate it was to accuse him of being excessively pro-Russian. And the Serbian media loyal to him presented this as a presidential promise to create a joint commission with Russia to deal with the unruly intermediaries together.
Moscow could have easily prevented Vucic from getting off so easily – for example, by using Sputnik Srbija or RT Balkan, which are under its control and quite popular in Serbia. But it did not do this because Vucic has not recently done anything so outrageous that he should be punished for it.
There are currently several open issues in the relations between the two countries, which theoretically could lead to disputes, but so far Serbia has been quite constructive on all of them, even from Moscow’s point of view. Serbian lobbyists have once again managed to convince the Americans to postpone the commencement of sanctions against the Serbian oil company NIS, which the US introduced under Biden because the majority stake in the company belongs to Gazprom structures. There is no doubt that the Serbian authorities would not mind taking advantage of the situation to increase their influence on the management of the country’s largest taxpayer. But they also understand that a break with Gazprom would cost Serbia dearly now, and they are carefully avoiding any sudden moves.
Especially since the countries are simultaneously discussing a new long-term contract for gas supplies. The matter is dragging on, but this is more due to technical issues – the Serbs want to extend the term of the deal from the previous three years to a full ten. Moscow has already extended the old contract on the same preferential terms through late September and can hardly afford to push it. Previously, Serbia was just one of Gazprom’s small clients, which could be completely disconnected and you wouldn’t even notice. Now Serbia is not only one of the last buyers of Russian gas in Europe, but also a key transit country, through which the last working gas pipeline to the European market passes.
On the political front, Belgrade is not allowing itself to go overboard either. Serbia still refuses to join the sanctions against Russia, despite regular criticism from the EU. Media loyal to the Serbian authorities continue to cover the Kremlin’s policies in a complimentary manner, maintaining the necessary level of Russophilia in public. Belgrade still refuses to make concessions on Kosovo, maintaining Serbia’s dependence on the Russian veto in the UN Security Council.
Finally, inspired by the new course of the US under Donald Trump, Vucic even conceded to Moscow’s persuasion to come to the parade on May 9. And he came, despite the closed skies and the EU’s threats to cut off funding. This did the Kremlin a great favor, allowing them to state that even European leaders – note the use of the plural – Vucic and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico – had come to the parade.
Considering that Serbian shells for Ukraine became known back in early 2023, Moscow had no reason to suddenly lose its temper and punish Vucic. In fact, it did not punish him. The unexpected press release of the SVR did not so much create problems for Vucic at home, where mainly pro-European and pro-democratic Serbs have been protesting against him for six months, as it eased a touchy international situation.
Vucic’s visit to Moscow did indeed cause strong discontent in Brussels, where in mid-May they seriously discussed the possibility of freezing payments to Serbia under the European Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Combined with protracted and truly massive protests at home, the increased pressure from the EU did not bode well for the Serbian leader. But now at least some of the problems have been alleviated – it is difficult to accuse the president, whom Moscow itself supposedly curses for stabbing him in the back, of being excessively pro-Russian.
It is difficult to say exactly what was motivating SVR leadership when they decided to issue this press release. Perhaps it was an attempt to pull Vucic up so that he would not completely lose his bearings in his military supplies to Ukraine. Perhaps it was a light jab to make Belgrade more accommodating on some other issue.
Or perhaps it really was a helping hand, protection from Western criticism in gratitude for the visit on May 9. At least Aleksandar Vulin, who has been responsible for relations with Russia for Vucic for many years, was in Moscow at that time. Moreover, he was at the same event as his old acquaintance, the head of the SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, just before the publication. But one thing is definite: this was not an attempt by the Kremlin to undermine Vucic or a sign of a looming rift between the two countries. Russian-Serbian friendship is too beneficial for the leadership of both countries to pretend to be otherwise.
Translating History 