Document 3: 12 March 1962: Report from A. Adzhubey regarding his trip to the US and meeting with President Kennedy
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TsK KPSS
During my time in the United States, Brazil, and on the way to Mexico, I had several meetings with US President John Kennedy, his brother Robert Kennedy, and a number of other officials from the President’s entourage, in Brazil – with President Goulart, Prime Minister Neves, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dantas, and a number of other officials. In Mexico – a brief conversation with President Lopez Mateos. Telegrams from these countries were sent to Moscow which reported on the nature of these conversations. I would like to report to the Central Committee on a number of specifications and circumstances in which the meetings and conversations took place in the US in order to somewhat complement the picture.
The first thing that was immediately noted by American journalists and Washington-credentialed journalists from other Western countries, was the increased interest among the American public to the fact, as Lippman put it, that there are frequent contacts between the US and the USSR at various levels. At the time that I was in the United States, this had to do with the fact that M. Kharlamov met in Paris with P. Salinger, the newspapers were abuzz with the possibility of R. Kennedy making a trip to the USSR, and last of all, were editorializing about the President inviting me to breakfast. There was a great deal of speculation to that end, and direct questions during the reception in the Embassy, which was attended by prominent journalists: Lippman, Childs, Reston, Higgins, the directors of television and radio broadcasters, and so on. As I understood it from conversations with these journalists and from press accounts, in the United States they perceive any step that one way or another, from the Americans’ point of view, supports the settlement of American-Soviet differences, with a heightened level of anxiety and exceptional interest. I have been to America many times, but never have I seen such nervous anticipation of an improvement to relations between our countries as this time.
Some time ago, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev said that the time will come when the American people will start to wake up, that the Americans will stop being lazy slugs that sun themselves on a warm beach. It appears that the time is now approaching. In any case, as these experienced American journalists quite openly told me, in large measure, they themselves don’t recognize Americans. Childs said regarding the prosecution of the US Communist Party, “If this wasn’t the case, it’s possible that – like before – many thousands of Americans, especially the youth, would not take any great deal of interest in Marxism or your ideals. But now, even when I’m at the university, just because I’m somehow acquainted with Russia, they no longer ask me about my trips to other countries, but instead, what I think about Communism.” When I told Lippman that there was a pleasant atmosphere at the Embassy today, he smiled and said, “I should think so! You’ve already signed the German Peace Treaty, established the boundary in Berlin, erected the barrier, and since you’ve signed the treaty and war didn’t break out, I’d say everything’s settled down.”
I pretended I didn’t understand Lippman, and told him, “The treaty still hasn’t been signed. I think you’re trying to put the cart before the horse.”
“No, it’s you that are putting the cart before the horse,” Lippman said. “You know that only too well, and more importantly, your premier knows it too.”
At that moment, a number of other journalists approached us, including Childs and Reston. Having heard what we were discussing, one of them said, “I’m certain that you won’t be signing that German Peace Treaty for quite some time.”
“And why is that?” I asked.
“Because it’s always convenient to have a neighbor you don’t like who’s got corns on his foot. When that’s the case, you’ll always have a chance – without warning – to step on his corn and hurt him, then beg his forgiveness and say that you hurt him by accident.”
There was a sense during the conversation about Germany and the West Berlin problem that it’s not perceived with the same level of interest by American journalists that it was some months ago.
Violating all standards of protocol, several dozen American journalists and Kennedy advisors were delayed in the Soviet Embassy on this occasion until almost midnight. If one were to generalize the conversation that took place that evening, then its content would be as follows. Eisenhower became President of the United States of America, first, because he himself is viewed in the eyes of the American people as a hero of World War Two. Second, and this is quite significant, Eisenhower acted as a peacemaker in the Korean conflict. His declaration that, if elected, he would succeed in bringing peace to Korea, all but handed him the presidency. Kennedy does not have many of the advantages that Eisenhower did, particularly in terms of popularity. The Kennedy Administration and the newspapers and magazines that support Kennedy, including some of the large newspapers (the New York Times) are trying to make him into a political [one word unclear]. Newspapers publish various articles about the story of John Kennedy’s ascendancy. Here there are stories about his service in the Navy during the war, grand promotional material regarding his various appearances and statements, and here, a story about the Kennedy family, which is depicted as the ideal American family. As a joke, one of the journalists even said “We know that the Soviet Union is struggling with a cult of personality. We’ve clearly got the cult of Kennedy starting up, and it’s possible we’ll have to struggle with this cult sometime down the road.”
Without question, Kennedy is very anxious and thinks a great deal about how difficult it will be for him to win a second term. There can be no doubt that Kennedy will be nominated and that his administration is already preparing for this, aggressively brainwashing the public. However, Kennedy himself, as well as his brother and the people close to him are thus far terribly alarmed by the fact that Kennedy won the election with only a slight advantage over the Republicans. Currently, all efforts are being undertaken so that even before the new election campaign begins, he will have an even stronger footing, so that he would go into the polls with greater ease. This fact is forcing Kennedy’s hand, as well as those close to him, in several directions, and in each of them using different methods. One I already spoke of, the cult of Kennedy. The second is to present the case in such a way that Kennedy has surrounded himself with the best and brightest Americans, that he has created a dynamic Administration. Journalists, not without obvious pleasure, report that Kennedy himself – as well as the people close to him – blatantly mock Eisenhower, who is now openly referred to as the golf president. To this end, Reston told me a joke that, as he conveyed, they avoided relaying to foreigners during the Eisenhower administration: “When Ike planned on heading out to you guys, to the Soviet Union, in America, a rumor was circulating that Mr Khrushchev had a golf course put together somewhere near Moscow for a round of golf. So our folks were saying: The fact that Ike plays golf in the United States, that’s part of the problem. When he wins or loses in America, it will only concern us Americans in the end. Premier Khrushchev would certainly lose to Eisenhower in golf in the Soviet Union, and flattered by the victory, the old man loses to Khrushchev along all other lines.”
There is one very important thing for Kennedy and, as I understood it, for any future American president. The President of the United States has to be able to converse, as they put it, with Soviet leaders. This privilege is ultimately the most important. And it’s not without reason, as the story goes, when canvassing for Kennedy at many rallies, it was imparted quite directly: “Nixon will not prove able to talk with Premier Khrushchev, and if he can, it will only be in the kitchen //in saying this, they were ironically ridiculing Nixon’s conversation with Khrushchev in the kitchen of the typical American home during the American exhibition in Moscow//. Kennedy will know how to talk with Premier Khrushchev.”
The Kennedy administration has quite an impact on Americans across the board, as noted above. And yet Kennedy himself and his circle are concerned that he has yet to show Americans that he can converse and settle difference with the Soviet Union. When Childs and I bade farewell //we’ve known each other for a long time, we both participated in the 1959 New Year discussions in Paris// he stated frankly: “We came to the Soviet embassy today and spent so much time here because we are under the assumption that Kennedy has evidently decided to show that he will be beginning a serious dialogue with Khrushchev.” I answered that I could not vouch for Kennedy, but as far as the Soviet government, it is always prepared for serious conversations regarding the resolution of differences. Childs added: “As you know, I sympathize with the Democrats, and I’m worried about Kennedy. He maintains approximately 125,000 reservists in the army. That’s 125,000 votes against him, plus their wives, fiancés, mothers, and fathers – that’s around half a million votes. Elections will be held in November 1962 for the House of Representatives and one-third of the seats in the Senate. Although in the United States the president can get by without a majority in either the Senate or the House, it is still better to have this majority. As a result, the November 1962 elections,” Childs concluded, “will be a sort of rehearsal before his re-election campaign, which Kennedy will begin sometime in 1963.”
The day after my arrival to Washington, the president held a breakfast attended by his wife, her sister, and Bolshakov and his wife. Such a detail attracts attention. When I said good morning to Kennedy, he almost immediately brought up the topic of Cuba and how I liked it there. Receiving a suitable response, he hesitated, then said:
“How is Che Guevara?”
I answered that, by all appearances, he was rather well, although I didn’t see him often, and asked him in turn, why was the president suddenly interested in one of the participants of the Cuban revolution?
“I read some press and reports,” answered Kennedy.
In turn I remarked: “You are interested in the events in Cuba, and that’s your right. But when we read that the US plans to invade Cuba, we feel that that’s not your right.”
“We are not planning an invasion of Cuba,” Kennedy answered.
I reminded him: “And what of the mercenaries from Guantanamo and those other countries? Have you already changed your opinion that a certain landing in April 1961, that it was a mistake for America?”
Kennedy pounded his fist on the table and said:
“At the proper time, I called Allen Dulles and let him have it. I said to him: learn from the Russians. When things were going rough for them in Hungary, they cleaned up the conflict in just three days. When they didn’t like events in Finland, that country’s president went to meet with the Soviet Premier in Siberia, and everything panned out. But you, Dulles, couldn’t do a thing.’”
I answered the President:
“With regard to Hungary, your analogy with Cuba is simply without merit. With regard to Finland, perhaps this is the case that should suggest to the United States that they need to learn to respect Cuba. After all, we respect Finland, and even though they have capitalist ways, the president of a bourgeois government maintains amicable relations with the Soviet Union.”
Kennedy was silent, and then said starchily:
“It is very hard, even from a psychological point of view, for the American people to agree with what is going on in Cuba. It’s only 90 miles from our coast. Very hard,” he repeated, and then added, “Cuba will fall from within.”
“It is necessary to put up with many things,” I remarked to the President. “And there are many things to become accustomed to, which clearly includes many new things that the American people must get used to. So long as you do not meddle in Cuban affairs, that is the most important thing. And your people will understand.”
Kennedy remarked rather sharply:
“We will not be meddling in Cuban affairs.”
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During my visit to Washington, Brazil, and passing through Mexico, I had a few meetings with US President John Kennedy, his brother, Robert Kennedy, and a few other figures from the President’s circle. In Brazil I met with President [João] Goulart, Prime Minister [Tancredo] Neves, Minister of International [Foreign] Affairs [San Tiago] Dantos, and a few other officials. In Mexico I had a short conversation with President [Adolfo] Lopez Mateos. Telegrams were dispatched to Moscow from these countries in which the character of these conversations was reported. I would like to report to the Central Committee a few more details and circumstances about the meetings and conversations which occurred in the USA which will help to complete the picture.
Firstly, what surprised American journalists and journalists of other Western nations accredited to Washington was the heightened interest of American society in the very fact, as [columnist Walter] Lippmann expressed it, of the contact between the USA and the USSR on various levels. When I was in the United States this concerned M. Kharlamov’s meeting with [White House press secretary] P[ierre]. Salinger. The newspapers made a lot of noise about the possibility of J. Kennedy making a trip to the USSR. Finally there was talk of the president’s inviting me to breakfast. There were a number of conjectures on this account and many direct questions at the time of the reception at the embassy, at which many notable American journalists were present: Lippmann, [St. Louis Post-Dispatch correspondent Marquis] Childs, [New York Times reporter James] Reston, [New York Herald-Tribune correspondent Marguerite] Higgins, directors of television and radio companies, etc. It was possible to understand from the conversations with these journalists, from the announcements of the services, that in the United States there is now a heightened nervousness and extraordinary interest in taking any step, which could occur in one way or another, that from the point of view of Americans promotes the possibility of reconciling American-Soviet differences. Much has happened to me in America, but I have never seen such agitated anticipation for the improvement of relations between our countries as exists now.
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev said that the hour has come—the American nation is beginning to wake up and Americans are ceasing to be lazy seals that warm themselves on warm shores. It is clear that the time is approaching. In any case, as the most experienced American journalists say frankly, in many respects they can’t figure Americans out. Thus Childs has said about the persecution of the Communist party in the USA: “If it was not for this occurring, it is possible that in the past thousands of Americans, especially the youth, would not have demonstrated a large interest towards Marxism and your ideas. Even now when I [visit] universities, because I am familiar with Russia in a way, they don’t ask me about my travels in other countries but what I think about communism.” When I told Lippmann that there is a very positive atmosphere at the Soviet embassy, he laughed and rejoined:
“And how! You’ve signed the German peace treaty, established a border in Berlin, put a gate there, and since you signed the agreement a war hasn’t started, and now everything is settling normally.”
I gave the appearance that I did not understand Lippmann, and said to him:
“The agreement is still not signed. You are clearly getting ahead of events.”
“No, it is you who have gotten ahead of events,” Lippmann remarked, “you understand everything wonderfully, and most importantly, your premier understands this.”
At this very moment a few other American journalists approached us, including Childs and Reston. Hearing what was being said, one of them remarked:
“I am sure that you will not sign the German peace treaty for a long time yet.”
“Why?” I asked.
“Because it is very convenient to have a callus on the foot of your neighbor who you don’t particularly like. There is always the possibility in such cases of unintentionally disturbing this callus and doing your neighbor harm, but then [you can] excuse yourself and say that it was an accident.”
At the time of the conversation about Germany and the problem of West Berlin it was perceived that the American journalists lacked the level of interest they had only a few months ago.
Violating all norms of protocol, a few dozen American journalists and Kennedy advisers stayed at the Soviet embassy until almost midnight. If I were to summarize the conversation that occurred that night it would go something like this. Eisenhower became president of the USA at first because in the eyes of the American people he was considered to be a hero of the Second World War. But the second time, in this very capacity, Eisenhower came forward like a peacemaker in the Korean War. His announcement that if elected he would succeed in achieving a Korean peace practically won him the presidency. Kennedy did not have many of Eisenhower’s advantages with regard to popularity. Kennedy’s administration, and the journalists and newspapers which supported Kennedy, including a number of prominent newspapers like the New York Times, tried to do his political business for him. The newspapers were full of various articles telling the story of the ascent of John Kennedy. They talked about his service in the navy during the war, and there were big advertisements on the occasion of his various appearances and speeches; there was [also] the story about the Kennedy family as being the ideal American family. One of the journalists even said to me as a joke: “We know that the Soviet Union struggles with the cult of personality. It is clear that we have begun our own cult of Kennedy and it may be that at some point we will have to struggle with this cult.”
It goes without saying that Kennedy was often worried and was preoccupied with the idea that it would be difficult for him to win the votes [needed] for a second term. Kennedy had already announced his candidacy and his administration was ready to actively cultivate public opinion; of that there could be no doubt. However, Kennedy himself, his brother, and those people closest to him until that time were extremely alarmed that Kennedy had not won the election with a very large advantage over the Republicans. Now they are making every effort to start a new election campaign and gain a firmer position from which to go to the polls against the Republicans more boldly. This circumstance is forcing Kennedy and his closest people to take various measures in connection with all of the following methods. I’ve already spoken about one of these, the Cult of Kennedy. A second is to present the affair in this manner – Kennedy has gathered around himself the most intelligent Americans and that he organized a dynamic administration. Not without obvious pleasure, journalists announced that Kennedy himself and those closest to him openly mocked Eisenhower who was now openly called the Golf President. In connection with this, Reston told me a joke, which as he expressed it, he tried not to tell to foreigners during the reign of Eisenhower: “When Ike planned to go to meet you, the Soviet Union, there were rumors in America that Mister Khrushchev prepared a field to play golf somewhere in Moscow.[1] In that connection we said: “When Ike plays golf in the USA that is only half the trouble. When he wins or loses in America it concerns only us Americans in the end. Premier Khrushchev will surely lose to Eisenhower at golf in the Soviet Union, and along with this victory, the old man will lose to Khrushchev in completely different terms.”
This was one extremely important thing for Kennedy and any other future American president. The President of the United States must be able to speak, so they say, with Soviet leaders. In the end, this advantage seemed to be the most important. With good reason, so they say, during agitation at meetings many voices really rallied around Kennedy, saying: “Nixon cannot talk with Premier Khrushchev, and if he can it is only in the kitchen (in that way, the conversation between Nixon and N. S. Khrushchev in the kitchen of a typical American household during the American exhibition in Moscow was ridiculed.) Kennedy knows how to speak with Premier Khrushchev.”
The Kennedy administration has persistently influenced the American people in the manner described above. Kennedy himself and his circle, however, are worried that he will not be able to prove to Americans in time his ability to make agreements and reconcile the continuous questions about the Soviet Union. When Childs and I said goodbye to one another (Childs and I have been acquainted for a long time. We participated together in the New Year’s discussion in 1959 in Paris), he frankly said: “We came to the Soviet embassy today [and] spent so much time here because we supposed that Kennedy had obviously decided to show that he is seriously beginning a serious dialogue with Khrushchev.” I answered that I could not vouch for Kennedy but that as concerns the Soviet government it is always prepared for serious conversations regarding the resolution of differences. Childs added: “As you know, I sympathize with the Democrats and am worried about Kennedy. He maintains approximately 125,000 reservists in the army. This is 125,000 votes against him, plus their wives, fiancés, mothers, and fathers, that is, around half a million votes. In November 1962, elections will be held for the House of Representatives and one-third of the seats in the Senate. Although in the United States the president can do without a majority in either the Senate or the House, it is better to nevertheless have this majority. In this fashion, the November 1962 elections,” continued Childs, “will be a kind of rehearsal before his re-election campaign, which Kennedy will begin sometime in 1963.”
The day after my trip to Washington the president had me over for breakfast [on 30 January 1962], at which his wife, her sister and [Georgi] Bolshakov and his wife were in attendance.[2] This detail drew my attention. When I exchanged greetings with Kennedy he almost immediately directed the conversation towards Cuba and how I liked it there. Receiving a suitable answer, he paused a little and said:
“How is Che Guevara?”
I answered that he didn’t seem to look bad, although I didn’t see him often, and asked him in turn, why was the president suddenly interested in one of the participants of the Cuban revolution?
“I read some dispatches to the press,” answered Kennedy.
In turn I remarked: “You are interested in the events in Cuba, that is your right. But when we read that the USA plans to invade Cuba, we don’t think that this is your right.”
“We are not planning an invasion of Cuba,” Kennedy answered.
I reminded him: “And what of the mercenaries from Guantanamo and those other countries? You already changed your opinion regarding the landing in April 1961, that it was a mistake for America?”
Kennedy hit his fist on the table and said:
“Once I summoned [then CIA director] Allen Dulles and rebuked him. I said to him: ‘learn from the Russians. When they had a tough situation in Hungary [in 1956], they put an end to the conflict in just three days. When they didn’t like the events in Finland, the president of that country went to meet with the Soviet premier in Siberia, and everything was worked out. And you, Dulles, couldn’t do a thing.’”
I answered the President:
“With regard to Hungary, your analogy with Cuba is entirely untenable. With regard to Finland, well maybe this is the case, which should make the United States aware that they need to learn to respect Cuba. After all, we respect Finland. Even though Capitalist elements exist within it, the president of a bourgeois government retains good relations with the Soviet Union.”
Kennedy became quiet, and then with earnestness said:
“From a psychological point of view, it is very hard for the American people to agree with what is going on in Cuba. After all it is only 90 miles from our coast. It is very hard,” he repeated, and then added, “Cuba fell from within.”
“It is necessary to become reconciled with a great many things,” I remarked to the President. “And there are a great many things to become accustomed to, and it is clear that there are a great number of new things that the American people must get used to. Only do not meddle in events in Cuba, this is most important. But your people understand this.”
Kennedy remarked sharply:
“We will not meddle with events in Cuba.”
“It’s too bad, Mister President,” I said to him, “that there is no way of publishing these words of yours in the newspapers.”
Kennedy asked, “How did Castro react to the fact that you were invited to Washington from Havana?”
I said that Castro was very happy about this, since he stands for peaceful coexistence, including an improvement in Soviet-American relations.
“We can talk about this after breakfast, if you please.”
Then, as I have already written, Kennedy sent Salinger and Akalovsky away, and asked Bolshakov to be the interpreter. The conversation continued for almost two hours. The subject matter of the conversation has already been reported from Washington.
During the conversation, Kennedy said that he had arranged for press conference on the following day, one which he usually held at the State Department. Over 400 journalists were present at the press conference. There was heightened interest. Although it took place immediately after the end of the conference in Punta-del-Este, Kennedy literally sputtered only a few words about the inter-American conference. He was not asked a single question associated with the conference. On the sidelines, American journalists asked: “What is there to ask the president, when the United States has failed? Brazil, Mexico and a number of other countries slapped us in the face.”
One question was asked, certainly, which clearly got under Kennedy’s skin. One of the journalists asked: “In light of the conclusion of the conference at Punta-del-Este, will the United States be returning to normal trade relations with Cuba, or will it still not be possible to buy cigars there?” In an annoyed tone, Kennedy responded, “I haven’t a clue. It seems that there is some talk about the sale of some medical supplies. Maybe we’ll receive cigars in return,” prompting a burst of laughter in the hall.
A handful of questions about Soviet-American relations were asked, including whether or not Kennedy is planning to visit the Soviet Union, and whether or not he’s been invited to do so. Kennedy was taken aback by this question, and was feeling particularly uncomfortable due to the presence of Soviet journalists. His answer seemed evasive, from which the following could be evinced: I would like to, but nobody’s extending any such invitation.
For the record, the topic of Kennedy traveling to the Soviet Union and meeting with N. S. Khrushchev is a constant presence in American newspapers. All of the Americans with whom I have had the opportunity to speak, if they are in any way interested in political matters, ask about this.
I would also like to point out one more fact in connection with Kennedy’s press conference. He was asked many empty, overtly demagogic questions on minor issues. This created the impression that this was a waste of time, the same old “American tradition” created by the imperial propaganda machine for duping the people.
After the press conference, Kennedy asked about one more meeting which, as he phrased it would, be of a strictly confidential character. This has already been reported to Moscow.
Mind you, the president has a fear of plainly and openly taking on Soviet journalists. Through Bolshakov, it was arranged for Salinger that at 6:00 in the evening a car would come for me from the White House, in which I would ride around the city so journalists would not discover the president’s new meeting with a Soviet editor. And sure enough, for some time the car carried us down some long streets, and at last we arrived at the White House on the side of the president’s private entrance. The gate opened quickly, we were asked for no documents, and the car went right up to the entrance.
Kennedy was walking around the corridor, waiting. He immediately came into the room and for once, began the conversation, albeit in a nervous tone. Gesticulating, he said: “Your troops are in Europe. I know the strength and capabilities of your military machine. Khrushchev can, of course…” — and Kennedy motioned with his hands — “…grab West Berlin. But then this would possibly prompt a breach between the Western countries and your country, and lead to tension.
“I want to emphasize to you again, in all solemnity, that my plans include finding some impactful solution to this problem without encroaching on the positions that you cannot concede, as well as those positions from which we cannot retreat. I ask you to report, and if possible, to do so by word of mouth, that the US, England, and France are opposed to German reunification. Such a dynamic and powerful state would concern us. We realize that such a union is unrealistic; however, in principle I have to talk about a union. And because of this there could be no talk about recognizing the GDR [German Democratic Republic], as well as recognizing the border on the Elbe – that is, the border between the two Germanys. As far as other border questions are concerned, it is entirely possible that the steps to be taken to resolve our disputes will lead to an announcement of the recognition the Oder-Neisse line.”
Kennedy quite insistently, as in the first conversation, drove the message that in the next several years it will be necessary to work out certain mutually-agreeable relationships that would lead to an easing of general world tensions and permit, as he observed, a more composed perspective from which to observe the global state of affairs. In that respect, he said that in Laos he will “twist the arm of Boun Oum” if, for our part, we guarantee him steady and calm behavior from the Pathet Lao.
Kennedy is clearly concerned about the situation in Southeast Asia and particularly, of course, in South Vietnam. He did not answer any questions about South Vietnam and the stance of the United States in South Korea, and had no desire to continue the conversation in this vein, steering away from it with the default phrase that neither the USSR nor the USA have major interests in that region, and we have to bear this in mind above all else. He once again repeated the notion previously stated that the United States of America and the Soviet Union may send many weapons there, but these weapons and these complications can be used by a third power more interested in a conflict between the USA and the USSR.
Then Kennedy spoke at length about how he had stressed that the top priority is the Berlin problem. Continuing the previous conversation, he said that he would very much like a more constructive and, as he clarified, more personal dialogues between Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson, since they currently only exchange general declarations. “I would like,” Kennedy said, “for them to sit at a table, holding a map of Germany, and begin looking for possibilities for a resolution equally agreeable to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. I want your government to understand: it is impossible for us to leave West Berlin or to permit a Soviet military presence there.” As for my question on why the discussion of guarantees can’t come from the United Nations or neutral states, he said that this is also not possible, that it would lead to the total collapse of the Western Bloc. “You understand,” he began to say, quite ill at ease, “the more complicated our relations are in Berlin and Germany, the more insistent Adenauer becomes. For now I have him reined in, and I have sufficient arguments for not providing the Germans with nuclear weapons. However, every one of these complications that arise between us only serves to incentivize revanchist elements in West Berlin.” This phrase of Kennedy’s was obviously calculated on some level to, if not frighten us per se, then certainly intimidate us.
I answered Kennedy: “It is not that we are afraid of West Germany, and the President understands this perfectly. Perhaps this is a delicate question,” I said to Kennedy, “but is the United States afraid, or still more, are England and France afraid of West Germany?”
“It is possible to be afraid of the Germans,” Kennedy answered. Then he said: “I understand that you and your allies aren’t comfortable with the words ‘occupation forces.’ But we’re talking about a small contingent of soldiers for whom it would be possible to find a different name. Now about the access,” Kennedy continued. “I see things realistically. Insofar as you so fervently object to international control of the autobahn, it is senseless for us to press the point. After all, the officers of the GDR are already (I thanked the President for pronouncing the full name, the German Democratic Republic, in my presence for the first time) affixing their stamps [to documents]. The important thing is not who is doing the affixing. Could you and I make believe for a bit (his exact words) about some accommodating steps regarding access for the Western powers to West Berlin? We are ready to meet the Soviet Union halfway, and West Berlin will not have political ties to the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. Perhaps you could meet us halfway in terms of easing up somewhat on the Western positions on the issue of access?”
Then the President developed the following idea: a situation could arise in which a Soviet ship is carried by storm into the waters of Franco’s Spain. “In such a case you would not make contact with Franco, but would you not ask that a third power somehow act on your behalf?”
“We already tried to do this, when the question involved the Soviet tanker Tuapse, which was criminally seized by your friend Chiang Kai-shek and nothing came of out it.”
“Let’s not talk about the past,” the President said. “We also have friends we dislike. So, if an American convoy of loaded trucks gets into a scrape on the autobahn, we cannot – and don’t try forcing us into – beginning a dialogue with Ulbricht. It would clearly mean being pulled into recognizing the GDR. To whom would we turn in such a case to undo, to get out from under this disturbance?”
I answered that if it we go by this simple analogy, it was obvious [that the answer was] a third power.
Kennedy said: “Now maybe it will be worthwhile to fantasize about this.” Once again he emphasized: “We understand we cannot establish international control, and of course it’s foolish to cling to the one affixing the seal.”
Then Kennedy spoke about how they are drafting, with Macmillan, new proposals for disarmament, which he considers would meet with a constructive attitude from the Soviet government.
(One can imagine how Kennedy was blindsided when he heard about our plan to convene the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at the highest level. This undoubtedly dashed Kennedy and Macmillan’s hopes for the initiative.)
Then Kennedy said that he personally welcomes the contacts existing between Bolshakov and Robert Kennedy, insofar as it gives him the ability to manage without the services of the translators from the State Department.
These observations show that surely in the presence of Akolovsky and even Salinger – a person closer to him – the President speaks a totally different language and is visibly more tense.
He asked: “Was your conversation with Robert Kennedy after breakfast interesting?”
I answered that his brother was quiet and barely touched on any international issues. Then, as if it were an afterthought, I asked the president:
“I recently saw in Life magazine a big portrait of your brother, Robert Kennedy, below which was a passage: ‘The number 2 man. The hard-to-control, defiant younger brother.’ Is this accurate, that Robert Kennedy has become the number 2 man in the USA?”
Kennedy was somewhat surprised:
“Even you turned your attention to this? I spoke with my brother about this, and said to him that if he is planning to become the number 1 man, it would not be so easy for him, and that he would first become the number three, four five, six man…”
“By the way – remarked Kennedy “there was bit of a scandal concerning my brother’s trip to the Soviet Union. Now we’re trying to find the person in the State Department, who made it public that Robert might privately visit the Soviet Union. I had really wanted him to touch base with Chairman Khrushchev. But when the American press made a fuss, we were forced to deny it. Clearly, all of this is a lot easier for you,” remarked Kennedy. “So you invited Salinger to Moscow and the Republicans are already attacking Salinger and me.”
Bidding farewell after our conversation, he asked me to pass along his regards to N. S. Khrushchev in the hopes, as he said smiling “of the possibility of a calmer meeting than in Vienna, where I was more concerned about how to conduct myself in front of an entire gaggle of journalists.”
Then Kennedy asked me how I spent my day in Washington. I answered that Washington is always boring because there is nowhere to go here: there are no theaters, no decent concert halls. “But tomorrow you will have a violin concert.” I offered. “By the look of it, it will be interesting to give it a listen.”
“Yes,” Kennedy confirmed, “Washington is certainly a capital without theaters. As you know, we plan to build a large cultural center in Washington, but this will require some 30 million dollars. Right now my wife and I are occupied with writing letters to various parties, asking for donations for the construction. But it is going very slowly. People aren’t interested in parting with their money.”
“But why wouldn’t you, Mr. President,” I asked Kennedy, “give the money from your own assets? After all, your family is very rich, and if you made such a grand gesture you would no doubt receive many kind words.”
Kennedy smiled and said completely frankly:
“Yes, but in this case, we are talking about my own money.”
The next morning, when I was to depart for New York for my flight to Mexico, Harriman unexpectedly called me and said that he was poised to come to the Soviet Embassy to see me for a few minutes or, if more convenient, asked me to come see him. I answered that it would be better if I came to Mr. Harriman. The conversation with Harriman lasted 15 or 20 minutes and was of a general nature. As Harriman was concerned with Laos, he reiterated Kennedy’s idea a few times that it would be good to reach an agreement concerning Laos. Then he asked me to send Khrushchev his best regards and said that he harkens back to the meeting with Nikita Sergeyevich and was happy to welcome him at his home back in the day.
“Our whole family remembers this visit and the Chairman’s ability to carry the conversation lightly and nonchalantly,” Harriman said. “I am an old man but I dream about a new meeting with Khrushchev and am sure we will certainly speak about US-Soviet relations.”
Harriman asked permission for several journalists and photographers to come into his office and repeat his greeting to N. S. Khrushchev and to repeat in the presence of the press that he would like to meet with N. S. Khrushchev to discuss many important issues. This was all obviously done with the consideration that Harriman’s name would once again appear in print, especially in connection with the fact that he is on speaking terms with N. S. Khrushchev.
A. Adzhubei
Translating History 